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Many Texas law enforcement agencies operate under a governing body called 
the Texas Civil Service Commission. The adoption of civil service is optional and is 
usually decided by the police officers’ association, which must be approved through 
citizens’ vote. Civil service outlines administrative rules, which are intended to fairly 
regulate processes such as hiring, promotions, and disciplinary action, thus removing 
the agency from the Texas at-will employment status. Research suggests that civil 
service generally improves officer treatment through structure (Whitton, 2011; Castillo, 
1993; Walters, 2002). However, these agencies experience problems with respect to 
sustaining disciplinary action up to termination. The rigidity of civil service creates a 
financial burden on a city with hiring, promotions, and firing, often rendering them 
vulnerable to damaging effects of the inability to discipline or remove incompetent and 
troublesome officers. The focus of this research is on the problems it creates for a civil 
service agency with strong emphasis on adopting a less restrictive governing process 
as opposed to civil service. The suggestion made is for city administrators and their law 
enforcement agency administration to come together with police officer associations to 
sculpt contracts that will serve to provide police officers with similar protection while also 
providing the agency administration with flexibility to adequately control regulations of 
employment processes. Through a devised system of checks, balances, and obligations 
from each stakeholder group, a fully supportive covenant stands to better regulate an 
agency while protecting the interests of all. Rather than operate under ridged rules 
outlined by the state of Texas, this process would allow the creation and refinement of 
rules for an agency that would work best for their unique setting.  
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Law enforcement is an occupation historically associated with high controversy, 
constant media attention, and political influence. With such sensitive and unpredictable 
factors involved, it would seem that standardization of all operations with police 
agencies, to include the absolute unbiased treatment of its officers, would be crucial in 
running such an organization. Although unique in many ways that may seem difficult to 
compare to most other professions, law enforcement is simply a business, and that 
which requires the impartial treatment of superior legal protection of all police officers if 
a police department expects to operate as a professional organization. 
The fact that Texas is an “employment-at-will” state makes the balancing of 
operating an agency that seeks the best interest of both the employee (officer) and the 
department a difficult task. Lacking a written contract with an employer in Texas allows 
the employer to terminate an employee for “good cause, bad cause or no cause at 
all…at any time, with or without warning, and with or without cause” (Texas Municipal 
League, 2005, para. 1). The only provisions in place for officer protection from wrongful 
termination are for issues arising out of age, race, gender, nationality, disability or any 
other federally protected classification (Texas Municipal League, 2005, para. 2). Since 
law enforcement may arguably be the most politically influenced occupation not under 
direct government control, problems with disparity in officer treatment and fairness 
would seem likely.  
According to Brooks (2011), in 1947, Texas state legislators recognized the 
importance of implementing a structured governing system for police agencies and 
created the Texas civil service statue that was later converted in 1987 to what is known 
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today as chapter 143 of the Texas Local Government Code (TLGC). Brooks (2011) 
stated that “civil service laws are designed to develop a public workforce less 
susceptible to the whims of patronage employment practices and dismissals without 
notice or cause” (para. 1). A second related aim is to “promote hiring and promotion 
decisions based on personal merit” (Brooks, 2011, para. 1). What legislators may have 
been eluding to is that if municipal police agencies cannot properly regulate themselves, 
then the government will regulate for them by implementing an option for police unions 
to adopt a “fundamental framework” for Texas cities (Brooks, 2011, para. 3).  
As stated by Castillo (1993), employees must be able to work in a favorable 
environment, one that is fair and allows achievement and growth if organizational 
efficiency and success is expected. It can be deduced that civil service adoption is often 
the product of unfair treatment of officers, faulty hiring and promotional practices, and 
poor standards all together. Although Texas civil service has accomplished what it 
originally set out to do and provides superior officer protection, it does little to protect the 
police department itself and the city by placing large financial burdens and tough 
restrictions on them. While civil service corrected many of the operational problems 
within police organizations, it also created many more. The research in this paper will 
demonstrate how police agencies under civil service governance have their hands tied 
in thick bureaucracy resulting in delays in new recruit selection and hiring, unqualified 
new hires, gross arbitration costs for disciplinary action, high rates of reinstated officers 
who were terminated for legitimate reasons, and more.  
As what may be viewed as a double-edged sword, more and more Texas police 
department unions are adopting civil service, which is usually due to discontent with 
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either actual or perceived unfair treatment from administrators or simply to safeguard 
officers for future issues. Another notable factor for a union’s sudden push for civil 
service is due to an increase in population to at least 10,000, which is the requirement 
for a city to be eligible for civil service adoption (Tex. Local Government Code § 
143.041).  As of the current year 2016, there are over 200 Texas cities eligible for civil 
service and many more are rapidly approaching that eligibility (Texas Cities by 
Population, 2016). The time for these cities to begin considering implementing a 
governing model to eliminate the need for civil service is now.  
This paper focuses on the subject of fallacies with the civil service system by 
pointing out where exactly it has failed. Although it will not provide a predetermined 
solution for the problems, it will allude to suggestions for approaching such a solution. 
The research herein also focuses on the Texas civil service system though some 
references may be used from outside state agencies and even municipal fire 
departments who are governed under the same or similar civil service models. It is 
important to note that this research is not intended to dismiss the value of civil service, 
but rather to point out its fallacies, why it is failing, and to suggest why a refined model 
of governance should replace it. Primarily, this paper will push for municipal police 
agencies to search for a self-governing model that will work efficiently and effectively 
which serves to balance the best interest of the officer, the police department, and the 
city for which it serves. In advocating for such a system, this paper will suggest that 





The vast majority of research will show that the adoption of civil service has and 
will continue to cause as many problems as it has solved. For example, selection and 
hiring of new officers is substantially delayed and better qualified applicants are often 
passed over because they did not meet a particular prerequisite. Civil service rules have 
strict provisions in place and in regard to hiring, applicants must be placed in order on 
an “eligibility list” according to the applicant’s examination scores.  Most civil service 
agencies in Texas post their applicant testing process online, which usually consists of 
at least a physical assessment test and a written exam. This rule will place priority on a 
candidate who is more physically fit and who scores higher on a written exam over a 
candidate who is more qualified. Civil service rules also requires the exhausting of a list 
in order of ranking, which will naturally create delays in the entire selection and hiring 
process (Tex. Local Government Code § 143.041). As explained by Castillo (1993), 
“Although civil service is designed to hire the most qualified, by its own standards, the 
system often blocks out the most qualified” (p. 9). Castillo (1993) further explained that 
these standards inevitably make the hiring process very long, often pushing away more 
desirable applicants.  
 Civil service regulations also place the burden of large arbitration costs for officer 
terminations on those respective cities. These regulations grant the officer the right to 
appeal a termination, which can take months and in excess of a year in some cases; it 
also forces a city to incur huge legal fees as they are proportionate to the length of the 
arbitration. Difficulty in terminating an officer for continued policy violations are revealed 
in an article about the termination of a police sergeant in Kyle, TX in May of 2015; that 
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arbitration was still ongoing as of May 2016 (Leos, 2016, para. 9). In a clear example of 
how civil service can damage a department, before this particular arbitration could be 
finalized with a determination, the private hearing examiner passed away, which 
rendered any and all findings of that examiner invalid. This hearing would have to be 
reset and reheard in a new trial (Leos, 2016, para. 14). Due to a technicality for which 
TLGC Ch. 143 does not have a safeguard in place for, this arbitration will continue, 
extending the total time in arbitration well past a year and further adding to legal costs 
for this single hearing. To add, this department will be unable to fill that position until a 
final disposition of this hearing is determined.  
According to the City of Kyle (n.d.) budget report for fiscal year 2015-2016, this 
city added $131,631 to their “Civil Service” line item which is used for arbitration and 
other legal fees involving officer disciplinary enforcement. In reviewing their fiscal year 
2016-2017 proposed budget, it shows they added $50,000 to this same line item. In 
further review, the total budget for this police department was just over six million for 
fiscal year 2015-2016. The total spent on civil service legal fees was approximately 2% 
of the entire police department’s budget for that year, revealing the financial impact 
incurred by small to medium sized police department due to civil service regulation (City 
of Kyle, n.d., p.131). To add, nothing within the civil service statute precludes a 
terminated officer from suing their department. In fact, many officers file lawsuits against 
their former departments for wrongful termination, which will naturally equate to an 
increase of legal fees. Leos (2017) explained how a police sergeant who was 
terminated from employment for numerous policy violations filed a federal lawsuit 
against the city who fired him. Lawsuits of this type, if ruled in favor of the plaintiff, can 
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cost a city millions of dollars. As demonstrated by Aele Law (n.d.), “Texas appellate 
court affirms award of $100,000 actual and $1 million in punitive damages” to a city 
employee for wrongful termination, and in a separate case, a state of Texas employee 
was awarded $13.5 million by a jury in a wrongful termination suit (para. 40).  
 Actual costs incurred from arbitration are not limited to attorneys’ fees and legal 
processes; for example, they will also include back pay to be awarded to an officer if 
that officer is reinstated for employment (Tex. Local Government Code § 143.041). 
Castillo (1993) explained that the rules outlined in civil service make disciplinary 
enforcement process very difficult. Because many cases of handed down disciplinary 
actions have resulted in large legal bills, civil service is viewed as a “system which 
allows them very little flexibility and often leads to a decision against appropriate 
disciplinary measures” (Castillo, 1993, p.15). 
 Combined with high costs for arbitration is also the high probability that even 
after a long and drawn out process, there is a substantial probability that the officer who 
was terminated from employment may get their job back meaning that the city would be 
forced to reinstate that officer, and to include back pay. In Beaumont, TX a police officer 
was terminated from employment after his police department determined that he had 
cheated on the entrance exam four years prior. The City of Beaumont v. Spivey (1999) 
case was taken to the Texas Court of Appeals which ultimately reinstated this officer. 
Per court records, the focal point relied mainly on technicalities due to the department 
not following civil service rules rather than the act that the officer was accused of. This 
reinstatement did not get ruled until four years after the termination and was ordered to 
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“reinstate Spivey as a city police officer with full seniority, back pay, and benefits, and 
awarded Spivey attorney's fees” (City of Beaumont v. Spivey, 1999, para. 2) 
 An article by CBS News discussed the difficulty in firing police officers, even for 
egregious acts, the process in trying to terminate officers has become an aggravating 
issue (“How fired police officers,” 2013). The “How fired police officers” (2013) article 
states, “officers appeal their cases to state arbitrators, civil service boards, or 
commissions—and many times end up back on the job” (para. 7). In Philadelphia, PA 
“nine out of 10 cops” terminated from employment are likely to have those termination 
decisions reversed (“How fired police officers,” 2013, para. 6). A particular case in 
Waco, TX that involved an Assistant Chief of Police who was fired after he was arrested 
and charged with driving while intoxicated was overturned. The termination was 
overruled through arbitration on the account that the hearing examiner exceeded his 
authority—a technicality (City of Waco v. Kelley, 2010).  
 The TLGC chapter 143.056e maintains provisions that in layman’s terms says 
that an officer who is fired for a criminal offense who is found not guilty of the offense 
still maintains the right to appeal the termination (Tex. Local Government Code § 
143.056). In a logical sense, the officer should be able to appeal the termination to get 
reinstated if found not guilty of the crime for which they were charged. However, nothing 
is outlined in civil service to safeguard the terminating police department if the not guilty 
verdict was due to a process infraction or technicality and not necessarily because the 
crime did not happen. In Columbus, Ohio, police and fire fighters are governed by civil 
service. According to Sullivan (2012), a Columbus, Ohio firefighter appealed his 
termination after being fired for fondling a 16-year-old girl for which he was formally 
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charged. The arbitrator ruled in this appeal in favor of the firefighter, reinstating his job, 
saying “even though he never denied fondling the girl, the city failed to prove 
wrongdoing” (Sullivan, 2012, para. 3). It was also pointed out, revealing continued 
difficulty for administrators governed by civil service platforms, that approximately 54% 
of Columbus police officers and firefighters who were terminated from employment got 
their jobs back through civil service backed arbitration. In the City of Austin, TX, a police 
officer was suspended once and fired twice for separate policy violations (Bien, 2015). 
The police chief who fired the officer went on record saying “[the officer] clearly 
neglected his duty and withheld pertinent and/or material information from his 
supervisors and the investigator” (Bien, 2015, para. 6).  Although the second 
termination was still pending an appeal from the officer, this is a clear example of the 
difficulty police administrator’s face in trying to enforce disciplinary action (Bien, 2015).  
An additional requisite of the civil service system may have a natural tendency to 
instill low productivity and performance within employees.  Most employers, regardless 
of the particular state, utilize some sort of merit system to not only gauge an employee’s 
performance though to provide an incentive for the employee to increase productivity 
through pay raises. In fact, the Texas Merit Council was established sometime in the 
early 1970s to maintain compliance with certain agencies which enforced the utilization 
of a merit based system (Walter, 2002). The Texas Merit Council was later abolished in 
1985. This may have paved the way for the Texas civil service system to mandate a pay 
scale system for officers which overrode any merit based or performance model 
(Walters, 2002, p. 12). Tex. Local Government Code § 143.041 mandates that all 
“police officers in the same classification are entitled to the same base salary.” What 
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this may translate to some is that regardless of whether one is a high performing and 
exemplary employee or the laziest who contributes little to none, they will get paid the 
same.  Problematic issues with this pay system may be inherent to the concept since 
there is no monetary incentive to putting in a hard day’s work. Ugah and Arua (2011) 
pointed this out while demonstrating the expectancy theory which says that the best 
influence in motivation for employees is when there is knowledge of some type of 
reward. However, “these positive effects tend to diminish over the long-term weakening 
links between individual performance and pay” (Choi & Whitford, 2013, p. 4).  
Strong rapport and a healthy working relationship is crucial in any organization to 
operate effectively and successfully. A police department is no different in that the 
police union needs to work along with and not against the city administrators in order to 
maintain efficacy. Once such example is shown with the case of Kyle, TX, when its 
police union petitioned for civil service adoption with heavy opposition from city leaders. 
During a city council meeting, city leaders voiced their opposition to such adoption as 
several perceived it as a threat to the city government primarily due to increased costs 
and apparent limited control they will have over police officers (Peterson, 2008). 
Another example of such conflict was reported by Anaya (2012), who quoted a letter 
drafted by the San Antonio Police Officer's Association and distributed to their city 
council saying the “SAPOA wants to work with the city, but refuses to negotiate unless 
the city manager stops threatening to force a new benefits plan on officers if an 
agreement cannot be reached by an October 1 deadline” (para. 1). This type of turmoil 




As with most laws, the civil service system was enacted into Texas law as an 
option for police departments for a reason, or for many reasons perhaps. Many police 
agencies do not yet qualify for civil service adoption due to the prerequisite of 10,000 to 
1,500,000 in city population; however, many Texas cities are rapidly approaching this 
mark. Whether it is a police department that has already adopted civil service or that will 
sometime in the future, the consensus may oppose implementing a self-governing 
system and, for those already with civil service, would likely hold very strong opposition 
to repealing it. One such reason would be that without civil service, police officers would 
not be afforded with adequate protection from disparate treatment and legal issues 
since Texas is an at-will employment state. What this means is that without a 
contractual agreement in place, an employer may change the conditions of employment 
for an officer and even fire the officer for any reason so as long as it does not 
discriminate for federal protected classes such as race, color, religion, gender, age, 
national origin, disability, or citizenship (Texas Workforce Commission, n.d.). Even if a 
police organization has implemented a “Code of Ethics and a Code of Conduct” for 
themselves, Whitton (2001) says these are ineffective if those bound by them do not 
understand or appreciate them (p. 3). 
 Through the strict adherence of facets such as internal policy, carefully 
constructed binding contracts for stipulations of employment, a city in collaboration with 
its police union can mirror guidelines outlined in civil service though with the ability to 
tailor and customize it as needed. As previously referenced, with a binding contract in 
place an employer would not be able to change conditions of employment or fire an 
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officer for no reason at all. Legal protection (counsel) is already available and has been 
for many years through legal firms who only serve Texas law enforcement such as the 
Texas Municipal Police Association (n.d.) who currently holds membership for over 
24,000 law enforcement officers. Texas state law also provides police and fire 
departments with the option to adopt a “collective bargaining” status which affords the 
right to assemble as a union and enter into contract negotiations with their city for 
benefits and salary (Tex. Local Government Code § 174.002). 
Another valid argument is that civil service was also created to eliminate 
cronyism, which is “the unfair practice by a powerful person (such as a politician) of 
giving jobs and other favors to friends” (Cronyism, n.d., para. 1). The concern would be 
how this would be prevented other than with civil service governing. One particular and 
important measure to implement protection from this is with accreditation through 
nationally recognized program such as the Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) (n.d.) whose purpose is “to enhance law enforcement 
as a profession and to improve law enforcement service delivery” (para. 1). This 
accreditation requires an agency to create a finite and comprehensive departmental 
policy and procedures manual and the commitment to adhere to aspects such as 
accountability, equity, and executive excellence. A similar recognition program modeled 
after “best practices” which “were carefully developed by Texas Law Enforcement 
professionals to assist agencies in the efficient and effective delivery of service, the 
reduction of risk and the protection of individual’s rights” is offered to Texas police 
agencies (Texas Police Chiefs Association, n.d., para. 1).  This program was designed 
specifically for Texas law enforcement agencies which provides the best practices for 
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issues specific to Texas. Although accreditations do not guarantee the prevention of 
unfair practices by police administration, they are designed to eliminate them in the 
masses since the program obligates those departments to uphold professional 
standards to maintain their accreditation.  
 Civil service was put in place for legitimate problems which it corrected; however, 
it also created many other problems along the way. For those cities with police (and fire) 
departments who qualify for or will be qualifying in the near future for civil service, it 
would be advantageous for those city leaders to initiate a campaign for such a self-
governing model, get police union buy-in, get it noticed by the community, and adopt 
such a model so that their police union never has a need to petition for civil service 
adoption in the first place. 
RECOMMENDATION 
In review, Chapter 143 of the TLGC was created to secure police departments 
and safeguard officer employment through proper regulation (Tex. Local Government 
Code § 143.041). However, it was demonstrated that civil service has fallen short of 
securing the administrative processes of police agencies in respect to officer 
employment thus revealing its failing points. It is the position of this paper to suggest an 
implementation of change for police agencies, one that will initiate a road map to a final 
destination of a near absolute balanced governing system affording both officer 
protection while ensuring necessary and ethical authority remains with the agency 
administration. 
Research showed particular failing points with civil service including gross delays 
in hiring new officers, promotional processes often resulting in unqualified and 
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undesired candidates, large arbitration costs incurred for disciplinary action (since most 
officers appeal long suspensions and terminations), creation of unhealthy relationships 
between the police union and city leaders, and the high officer reinstatement rate of 
terminated officers. Legitimate fear is present among police officers who currently 
operate under civil service rules that without it, adequate officer protection would no 
longer be available. To add, there would be nothing to prevent the problem of cronyism 
and other unreasonable forms of promotion. These are valid points, and since they 
cannot be ignored with a properly constructed binding agreement, a police agency could 
operate with equality more efficiently than under civil service.  
Cities and their police departments should explore an internal style of governing 
system before adopting civil service. Such an approach to implement a self-governing 
model of rules would likely be in the form of a binding contract that would mirror the 
outline of Texas Civil Service Ch.143 of the TLGC though one that would loosen the 
restrictions needed to eliminate the problems that civil service created. Specifically, all 
powers involved should collaborate and work in concert with each other to create a fine-
tuned regulatory system of checks and balances that would be absolutely adhered to. 
This would start with police department policy, city policy, the city charter and then to 
the police union bylaws. In conjunction with a perpetual binding contract, these policies 
would be designed to pivot off one another so that no single person or group of people 
could change any policy without a majority vote of all powers. The concept is to create a 
well-orchestrated and balanced set of policies and procedures that maintains the best 
interest of all stakeholders.  
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